Saturday, October 27, 2012

In more than one aspect, education is an Enlightenment notion. It is the result of the modern idea that man and society to some extend can be "made"[...]. For Kant education was seen as the "means" to become human, for example, rational; the person is nothing but what education makes him. This was itself a reaction to an earlier period, characterized by the inculcation of values, the uncritical learning of facts or bodies of information, and a concern with discipline understood as obedience to (persons in) authority. With the Enlightenment, rationality becomes the proper end of what a human being is. This does not result in a means-end reasoning: in becoming free from one's inclinations and passions, one realises one's true nature, for example, to put oneself under the guidance of reason. Because of his freedom, man is a task to himself: he has to realize himself at a rational level which implies the need for a morality. Man has to realize himself as a subject of practical reason, and he can do that in as far as he binds his acting to the law of his powers of judgment, for example, his rationality. As the ultimate aim is to become moral, education is shaped according to moral understanding. Thus, liberal education is concerned with the initiation of the learner into forms of thought and understanding which are part of the cultural heritage. In the German tradition, where at least initially this academic endeavor particularly flourished, the concept of education also encompasses child-rearing as well as more formal schooling.

The primary aim of the educational relationship between the adult and the child undergoing education is for the child to become an adult. The influence adults exert on children will bring them to the point where they can take up for themselves what is called a dignified life-project. Adults, supposedly being a representation, though certainly not the ultimate embodiment, of what is objectively good, are in a position to educate, since they themselves have already achieved adulthood. Responsibility for realizing one's life-project is dictated by reason. Adulthood shows itself by being in command of oneself, able to bind oneself to a law of one's choosing, to maintain steady relationships both morally and practically and not being reliant upon the judgments of others; to put this more positively, having personal access to objective standards of value and being able to place oneself under a higher moral authority. This will show itself in the adult's taking part in societal life in a constructive manner. The child, on the other hand, is helpless in a moral sense. He does not know what is good and therefore cannot take responsibility for his own actions. He cries out for guidance, and only if such guidance is offered, if adults (first the parents, and subsequently the teachers) make the necessary decisions in relation to the child, will he be able to reach adulthood. Central to this traditional concept of education is this intention on the part of the educator, and it is that which makes an activity educational. What the educator undertakes can only be justified as education in so far as it aims and contributes to adulthood and to the autonomy of the young person. The educator is, thus, responsible by proxy, and his relationship with the child is based on trust. This is no simplistic reasoning of a manipulative kind. The adult decides on behalf of the not-yet-rational child and in his best interests. By confronting the child with rationality in this way, the adult seeks to awaken the child's potentialities to become a rational human being. Such a view of the justification of parental authority belonged to the conception of a just, well-ordered society.

As indicated, the Enlightenment tradition is being concerned with the initiation of the learner into forms of thought and understanding which are part of a critical cultural heritage. Here, discipline is primarily an attuning of the mind to the inherent norms of these forms of understanding. The learner is initiated into forms of thought which are public but as yet beyond the child's understanding. In their strongest formulation these norms of rationality were thought to be stable and valid for all cultures. Such a view necessarily implies a transmission model of education and upbringing. The child may be conceived of as a passive recipient of rationality and culture or as recalcitrant material to be molded and inscribed. Alternatively, he must, like the barbarian outside the citadel, be lured in and skillfully initiated into the stock of worthwhile knowledge, sentiment, and inherently valuable activities and practices of civilized life.

-- from "The Origin: Education, Philosophy, and a Work of Art" by Paul Smeyer





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